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EXAMINING THE STRUCTURED USES
OF CONCEPTS AS TOOLS: CONVERGING INSIGHTS
Abstract
Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the
structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in ex-
periments. To illustrate this, I outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations
each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally discarded,
continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals.
In doing so, I highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights into how
the uses of current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of
literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable
scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012, Brigandt 2012, Feest 2010, Steinle 2012), the second strand
comes from the technoscientific studies focused on non-human agency (Pickering 1995), and the
third draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically
contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008, Tiles 1984).
Keywords: concepts-as-used, experimental practice, neuroscience, philosophy of science as prac-
ticed, history and philosophy of science, science and technology studies
Examining the historical development of scientific concepts offers a step
towards understanding the structured routines within which these concepts
are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. This claim draws on
three strands of scholarship that converge within the broader fields of his-
tory, philosophy, and social studies of the sciences. Each strand offers differ-
ent insights into how the uses of scientific concepts contribute to experi-
mental practices.
To illustrate the value of building on the convergence of these accounts of
scientific practice, I will outline how they can be brought together to help un-
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derstand a tension I identify between past and present uses of the concepts of
mental imagery and hallucination. To this end, I will discuss a series of ex-
amples where implicit associations between these historically interdependent
concepts can be seen in the structured routines of the current independent
goal-directed uses of these concepts during neuroimaging experiments.
1. HIGHLIGHTING THE CONVERGENCE
OF THREE STRANDS OF RESEARCH
The first strand of research I appeal to includes a range of philosophical
examinations into how the uses of scientific concepts enable scientific practices.
In this context, scientific concepts have been described as contributing to em-
pirical knowledge in ways that extend beyond their traditionally recognized
roles in mental and linguistic representation.1 This type of approach highlights
the multiple uses for scientific concepts in practice: from mediating the inter-
play between theoretical and experimental practices (Feest 2012, Bloch 2012a)
to contributing to experimental research in ways that are not determined by the
theoretical frameworks within which the concepts may also be embedded
(Arabatzis 2012). Concepts are shown to be used in theoretically polyvalent
ways (Arabatzis, Nersessian 2015, Schmidgen 2014), as useful even when they
fail to pick out natural kinds (Bloch 2012b, Waters 2014), and as patchwork ar-
rangements that, having unfolded over generations of historically contingent
uses, can resist individual intentions (Kindi 2012, Nersessian 2012).
This interest in scientific practice has supported detailed accounts of con-
cepts being used as investigative tools (Feest 2010, Bloch 2012a),2 as well as
accounts that highlight the ways in which concepts are used for pursing spe-
cific epistemic goals (Brigandt 2010, Steinle 2010).3 Leaving aside important
                                                   
1 Although outside the present scope, debates also continue around questions of how
general concepts function as mental and linguistic representations, particularly within the
history and philosophy of psychology (cf. Bloch-Mullins 2015, Machery 2007).
2 In this context, tools are devices that, whether physical or not, “enable us to do some-
thing” in ways that generate data — and therefore knowledge — within scientific practice
(Feest 2010: 180-181).
3 I am following others in using the term “epistemic goal” for those goals that pertain
to generating knowledge (Brigandt 2012: 78, Steinle 2012: 107, MacLeod 2012: 68). Within
this context, epistemic goals may be specific to a discipline (such as the goal of explaining
cell-cell interaction in cell-biology as Brigandt describes) or they may be specific to the
given collection of phenomena investigated (such as the goal of finding a regularity that
predicts the behaviour of a type of phenomena across multiple disciplines).
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differences, this strand of the philosophical literature highlights that concepts
are more than mental or linguistic representations: they can be used as theo-
retically polyvalent investigative tools for pursing specific epistemic goals.
Disconnected from these recent explorations of the uses of concepts is a
second strand of scholarship that contributes most directly to studies of sci-
entific and technological practices. Its focus is on the ways material instru-
ments can produce effects on the world that are outside the control of human
intention (Haraway 2006, Ihde 2009, Latour 2005, Law, Mol 2008, Robins
2008). Within this context, Andrew Pickering and Adam Stephanides (1992)
offer a tantalizing link between these accounts of material and various ac-
counts of conceptual practices.
Along with others in this area of scholarship, Pickering (1995) argues that
scientific knowledge emerges through the interactions between human agency
(intentional actions) and material agency (such as non-intentional material
resistances to human intentions). Building on this view of human–material
interactions, Pickering (1995: 115) further argues that systems of concepts, as
conceptual structures, can embody what he calls “disciplinary agency” — that
is, the agency of disciplined human performances that carry routine concep-
tual associations that hang together to “carry human conceptual practices
along, as it were, independently of individual wishes and intents.” Routinized
in this way, conceptual structures can act in an analogous way to the routi-
nized participation of machines in experiments (Pickering 1995: 29, 70). For
example, by embodying systematic “machine-like actions,” concept uses carry
routinized associations into experimental practices (Pickering 1995: 142-144).
Within individual experiments, these disciplined systems of conceptual asso-
ciations can then contribute to the production of scientific knowledge by
framing machinic performances (Pickering 2006, 2015). Positioned within
the context of studies of material instruments and conceptual practice more
broadly, Pickering’s approach suggests that there are disciplined routines of
using systems of concepts in ways that can contribute to investigative practice
in analogous ways to that of the routinized participation of machines in ex-
periments (Smith 2018a: 20-41).
The third strand of scholarship, intersecting with the other two, are his-
torical accounts of the contingent and heterogeneous elements of dynamic
scientific practices (Chang 2014, Pickering 2012, Steinle 2016, Rheinberger
2009).4 Two scholars who helped to forge this historically informed approach
to the philosophy of scientific practice were Gaston Bachelard and Georges
                                                   
4 While highlighting the contingent dynamics within which human, material, and con-
ceptual elements of experimental practices interact, these approaches share an underlying
appreciation of the robust scientific knowledge that contingent practices can generate.
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Canguilhem. Bachelard argues that it is only by examining the route which
led to the dynamic and “public life” of current concepts that the historical ac-
cretions entrenched in these terms can be realized (Tiles 1984: 157-159). This
insistence that a concept has a dynamic and historically contingent “public
life” stems from a view of concepts as being used by communities as they en-
gage in experimental practices (not just as elements of theories) such that the
uses of a concept are subject to the resistance of the material world (rather
than as determined by the relevant linguistic frameworks) (Tiles 1984: 153).
This notion of resistance (from the material world) draws attention to the
mutual instructions that can form between phenomena, instruments, con-
cepts, and experimental methods (Rheinberger 2009, 2010).
The dynamics between these mutually instructing aspects of scientific
practice emerge and change over time. For example, Bachelard emphasizes
that concepts carry remnants of their past through assumptions, conceptual
associations, and perceptual habits that can only be understood within the
broader (social and material) context of the historical development of a given
concept (Gutting 1989: 17). Similarly, Canguilhem (2008: 9, 43, 76) describes
the functions of concepts as grounded by the sets of historically contingent
experimental practices they are used within. In doing so, Canguilhem offers a
view of scientific concepts as complex and dynamic “laboratory actors” that
combine terms, definitions, and phenomena and interact with material de-
vices (Schmidgen 2014: 234, 254).
Although maintaining significant differences, drawing these three strands
of scholarship together demonstrates the value of examining the uses of sci-
entific concepts from multiple perspectives. I use each of these strands to
highlight a specific element of scientific practice: uses of scientific concepts as
tools for specific goals, the dynamic interactions between conceptual, mate-
rial, and human participants in experiments, and the continued relevance of
the historical contexts within which current concepts emerged.
To illustrate the value of this convergence, I will briefly outline an exam-
ple of the potential it offers for understanding how specific concepts are used
in practice. In doing so, I seek to highlight how scientific concepts can be
used as taken-for-granted tools that function within networks of routine as-
sociations. In particular, I aim to emphasize that these associations are
grounded by historically contingent dynamics that structure how specific
concepts are used (in concert with human and material participants) within
scientific practices.
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2. COMPARING THE CONCEPTS
OF MENTAL IMAGERY AND HALLUCINATIONS
This example is drawn from a larger project that involved a comparative
analysis of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucination as used in
documented neuroimaging experiments.5 Both concepts are used in neuro-
imaging experiments for individuating specific types of sensory-like mental
phenomena, which I’ll refer to as SLMP for short. As an analytic category,
SLMP include any wakeful endogenous sensation that occurs in the absence
of relevant perceptual stimuli. For example, visual SLMP are experienced, to
varying degrees, “as if” seen, auditory SLMP are experienced “as if” heard,
and so on for taste, smell, and the other sensory modalities. When it comes to
neuroimaging experiments, the concept of mental imagery is used to indi-
viduate those SLMP that merely resemble perception, while the concept of
hallucinations is used for individuating those SLMP that have a compelling
sense of perception.
While this difference in the degree of perceptual similarity is often taken
for granted, it turns out that attempts to differentiate between those SLMP
that merely resemble perception and those with a compelling sense of per-
ception were never adequately resolved (Smith 2018b). Instead, contrasting
sets of typical characteristics became associated with mental imagery and
hallucinations, respectively, that carried along entrenched expectations about
an idealized distinction between ordinary and pathological SLMP (cf. Table 1).
MENTAL IMAGERY HALLUCINATIONS
Perceptual Similarity Variable vividness of SLMP
Fleeting SLMP
Tentative SLMP
Abnormally vivid SLMP
Concrete SLMP
Palpable SLMP
Reported location Internally located
Not within perceptual space
Externally located
Within perceptual space
Volition and Control Effortfully generate SLMP
Manipulable SLMP
Dismissible SLMP
Spontaneous SLMP
Obstinate SLMP
Absorbing SLMP
Attribution of Source Self-attributed Not self-attributed
                                                   
5 The details of this comparative analysis are included in my dissertation (Smith
2018a). Here, I focus on exploring one of the research intersections that I drew upon as
part of that project.
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Level of Insight Insight maintained:
recognition that SLMP are
not perceptions
Lack of insight:
belief that the SLMP are
perceptions
Table 1. Inverse characteristics typically associated with either mental imagery
or hallucinations
As this table highlights, there was an inverse relationship between the sets
of characteristics typical of each concept: hallucinations can be characterized
as what mental images are not, and vice versa. The causal relevance of the
inverse characterization of two discrete types of SLMP remains disputed.
Nonetheless, these inverse characterizations enabled the concepts of mental
imagery and hallucinations to each be used as a tool for individuating specific
instances of SLMP for further investigation.
The relevance of the characteristics for the uses of these two concepts as
tools can be illustrated by drawing attention to a puzzle that emerges from
comparing the respective uses of these concepts in neuroimaging experi-
ments. The first piece of this puzzle is that reported findings (of correlations
between SLMP experiences and localized changes in neural activity) are
similar regardless of whether the concept of mental imagery or hallucinations
was used to individuate the instance of the type of SLMP being investigated
(Allen et al. 2008, Hill, Linden 2013: 34-35).
This overlap in findings is not surprising: recognized in meta-analyses
and literature reviews, it is usually explained as indicating that there is some
low-level sensory processing common to all SLMP. The expectation remains
that additional, as yet unidentified, top-down regulatory mechanism will
eventually explain the difference between the mere resemblance to percep-
tion of mental imagery and the dangerously perception-like hallucinations.
An overlap in the reported findings by experiments using the concept of
either mental imagery or hallucinations is therefore not a problem in and of
itself.6 Rather, the problem with the overlap emerges when the concepts of
mental imagery and hallucinations are used independently of each other de-
spite unresolved uncertainty about which of the processes are unique to ei-
ther. By avoiding the uncertainty around these similarities (and the problems
                                                   
6 For example, implicating similarly localized activity in the explanatory mechanisms
of two distinct mental phenomena may reflect genuine differences (macroanatomical regions
are well-known to contribute to multiple neurocognitive functions and there can also be
multiple networks of activity that incorporate overlapping regions during different mental
phenomena).
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this uncertainty presents for independent uses of each concept), the focus can
remain on developing neurophysiological explanations unique to just one of
these conceptualizations of SLMP. For example, the similarities are explained
away rather than investigated: presented as merely minor overlapping ele-
ments within two distinct neurophysiological processes (Badcock, Hugdahl
2012, Grossberg 2002, Shine et al. 2015).
These expected overlaps were evident in a comparative analysis of studies
using the concepts of either mental imagery or hallucination (Smith 2018a):
equivalent correlations between a given type of SLMP and a specific brain re-
gion were routinely reported regardless of whether the SLMP investigated
were conceptualized as mental imagery or hallucinations. More surprisingly,
this comparison also highlighted that such similar findings were never recog-
nized as such at the time. Instead, findings of SLMP-correlated changes in
neural activity were always reported as uniquely relevant to understanding
either the functions of mental imagery or the dysfunction responsible for
hallucinations.
This lack of recognition is highlighted by the published accounts’ of these
experiments failing to discuss the possibility that their findings might relate
to low-level processes shared by all SLMP. Instead, findings of equivalent
neural activity in any given brain region were always presented as supporting
divergent knowledge claims about the role of that region in the neurocogni-
tive processes proposed to underlie either mental imagery or hallucinations.
For example, the inferior frontal gyrus was argued to both demonstrate the
functional overlap between language processes and auditory mental imagery,
and demonstrate the role of language processing in underlying or reinforcing
the pathophysiology of auditory hallucinations (e.g., Diederen et al. 2010,
Hoffman et al. 2007, Rudner, Rönnberg, Hugdahl 2005).
One explanation for these diverging claims could be that the equivalent
experimental findings were simply interpreted differently. However, while
certainly part of the story, this does not offer a complete explanation. I have
argued that, in addition to this, the concepts of mental imagery and halluci-
nation were each used in the design and implementation of experimental
methods (Smith 2018a).
In this broader project, the accounts of scientific practice mentioned
above each contributed to my understanding of the uses of the concepts of
mental imagery and hallucination in documented experiments. Firstly, I ex-
plored how each concept functioned as a tool taken-for-granted in its use for
individuating a given type of SLMP during the design and implementation of
these experiments (an account that can be developed by drawing on the con-
cepts-as-used literature mentioned earlier). Secondly, focusing on their func-
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tions as taken-for-granted tools, I examined how these concepts each carried
along entrenched associations about distinctions between functional and
dysfunctional SLMP (highlighting the need to understand the historical con-
texts of concepts that Bachelard, Canguilhem, and others call for). Thirdly,
I argued that these associations were implicitly carried along by the routinized
uses of each concept in ways that interact with human and material elements
of experimental practices (a dynamic that can be understood by drawing on
the work on human—nonhuman interactions mentioned earlier).
To offer another example, the paradigmatic conditions for measuring the
neuroanatomical correlates of SLMP were always dependent on the concept
used to individuate the SLMP of interest. This can be illustrated by the way
that the inverse sets of routinized associations (Table 2) were evident in the
instructions given to subjects.
MENTAL IMAGERY HALLUCINATIONS ROLE OF CHARACTERISTICS IN
MEDIATOR-VIEW OF SLMP
Perceptual
Similarity
Low similarity to
perception
High similarity to
perception
Explains why SLMP are (or
are not) able to be regulated
by reasoned judgement
Reported
Location
Internally located Externally located
Volition
and Control
Voluntary and/or
Controlled
Involuntary and
Uncontrolled
Attribution
of Source
Self-attribution Other-attribution
Level of
Insight
Insight maintained Lack of insight
Table 2. Characterising concepts in the context of mediator-views of SLMP
For instance, when scanning for mental imagery, subjects were given de-
tailed instructions on how to act. No justifications were offered for the routine
inference that voluntary or manipulatable SLMP would be required for these
actions. In the few cases where self-reported characteristics of SLMP were
documented, they merely provided post-hoc justifications for the act requested.
In contrast, when scanning for hallucinations, subjects were instructed to be
passive: only to indicate the presence or absence of hallucinations. Any inclu-
sion of self-reports in experiments investigating hallucinations were secondary
and very carefully justified. Furthermore, when these self-reports of halluci-
nations failed to match up with expectations, they were casually disregarded.
Measures the degree to
which SLMP are regulated
by reasoned judgement
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Across multiple such examples, these concepts could each be understood as
a tool used for pursuing specific goals, a tool that carried historically contingent
routine associations that interacted with human and material elements of prac-
tice to intervene throughout the experimental design and implementation. For
example, the goal of the experiments using the concept of mental imagery was
always to understand the role of ordinary SLMP in neurocognition (and how
this might go awry). Whereas, when investigating hallucinations, the goal was
always to investigate dysfunctional neurocognitive processes.
At first pass, it is reasonable to expect that these differing goals simply re-
flect a disciplinary divide (between, say, psychology and psychiatry). How-
ever, disciplinary divides cannot fully account for what I found. Far from be-
ing discipline specific, the difference between the goals each concept was
used to pursue remained consistent across multiple variables: across several
disciplinary contexts, within shared publication constraints and methodo-
logical techniques, and for pursuing diverse experimental aims. A discipline-
level explanation would also obscure that these goals were theory-polyvalent
and specific to experimental practices. Indeed, broadening the contexts to in-
clude clinical practices reveals the ongoing difficulties in characterizing dis-
crete types of SLMP: depending on context, mental images are considered
both normal and clinically relevant. Likewise, hallucinations emerge as both
a key symptom of clinically relevant pathologies and are recognized as com-
mon within the non-clinical populations (cf. Tables 3 and 4).
TYPICAL
MENTAL IMAGERY
SPONTANEOUS
MENTAL IMAGERY
INTRUSIVE
MENTAL IMAGERY
Perceptual Similarity Variable Variable High
Location Internal Internal Internal
Volition Voluntary Involuntary Involuntary
Control Manipulable Manipulable Uncontrolled
Duration Fleeting Variable Extended
Attribution Self Self Self
Insight Maintained Maintained Maintained
Subjective Value Positive Positive Negative
Emotional-valence Benign Benign Disruptive
Content Useful Variable Unwanted
Frequency Variable Frequent Frequent
Table 3. Adapted characterisations of mental imagery
EDEN T. SMITH16
TYPICAL
HALLUCINATIONS
CLINICALLY RELEVANT
HALLUCINATIONS
NON-PATHOLOGICAL
HALLUCINATIONS
Perceptual Similarity High not specified not specified
Location External Variable Variable
Volition Involuntary Involuntary Involuntary
Control Uncontrolled Uncontrolled Uncontrolled
Duration Persistent Extended Fleeting
Attribution Others Variable Variable
Insight Lacking Variable Variable
Subjective Value Negative Negative Variable
Emotional-valence Disruptive Disruptive Benign
Content not specified Unwanted Variable
Frequency Frequent Frequent Variable
Table 4. Adapted characterisations of hallucinations
Rather than being tied to the dynamics of either a theoretical context or
a given discipline, I propose that these discrete goals can be better under-
stood as components of each concept by drawing on the strands of literature
mentioned earlier. In this context, the concepts of mental imagery and hallu-
cination can each be understood in the following ways: as (a) independent
tools used for pursing discrete goals; as (b) carrying along entrenched rou-
tines that structure their contribution to the dynamic human–nonhuman in-
teractions within localized experimental practices towards these goals; and as
(c) contingent upon the shared historical conditions within which these two
concepts came to be used independently of the other for pursing these goals.
More simply, the documented uses of these two concepts in neuroimaging
experiments can be understood in relation to the historical contexts within
which the uses of these interdependent concepts came to be structured as an
independent tool for investigating these specific goals. The details of the in-
tersection between the histories of these concepts are available elsewhere
(Smith 2018a, b). For the present purposes, I will highlight just two points.
The first point is that a shared philosophical view of SLMP pre-dates both
concepts. Within philosophy, SLMP have predominantly been positioned as
mediating between perception and thought by serving memory and imagina-
tion — a mediating role that needed to be carefully regulated to avoid con-
fusing thoughts with perception.7 Within this context, the same set of inverse
                                                   
7 Note that this philosophical tradition includes diverse views that are beyond the present
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characteristics outlined in Table 1 helped to explain when and why some ex-
periences of SLMP are necessary while other SLMP experiences are danger-
ous (Table 2).
During the 19th century, these same inverse characteristics helped to dif-
ferentiate between mental imagery and hallucinations. Along the way, the
concept of mental imagery came to be used for investigating those SLMP that
were positioned as required for experiencing memories and imaginations.
Meanwhile, the concept of hallucination came to be used for investigating
those experiences of overexcited memories and imaginations that led to fail-
ures in judgement or reason.
The second point to highlight is that the mediator view of SLMP was ef-
fectively abandoned within experimental uses of each concept by the end of
the 20th century. On the one hand, mental imagery went from being required
for thought to an unnecessary, and even childish, pastime. While the value of
mental imagery as a scientific concept was eventually rehabilitated, SLMP
remained merely one of the many forms in which sensory data were thought
to be represented in aid of thought. Meanwhile, views on hallucinations had
shifted. Rather than being investigated as a dysfunctional form of mental im-
agery, hallucinations became thought of as a disruption of any number of
other “normal” functions — including various perceptual, language, and at-
tentional processes.
Despite being explicitly abandoned, the mediator view of SLMP remains
evident in the unresolved tension between the current independent uses of
these two concepts and their interdependent histories. In line with the view
of Bachelard, Canguilhem, and others, the histories of these concepts provide
crucial context for understanding their current uses. In short, while the typi-
cal inverse characterization of mental imagery and hallucinations was once
philosophically justified, this justification is no longer considered an ade-
quate explanation for the relationship between ordinary and pathological
SLMP. Indeed, the typical characteristics used to distinguish between ordi-
nary and abnormal SLMP turn out to be unreliable at best (Smith 2018b:
chapter 3). Nonetheless, these characteristics — and the entrenched mediator
view associations they emerged within — continue to provide the unacknowl-
edged structure within which the concepts of mental imagery and hallucina-
tion are each used as independent concepts for investigating ordinary and
pathological SLMP respectively.
                                                   
scope: I simply seek to highlight that multiple philosophical accounts positioned SLMP as
a mediator, of variable value, between unruly bodily perception and the goal of abstract
thought.
EDEN T. SMITH18
Comparing how unexpected findings were accommodated provides a final
illustration of the ways in which the associations carried along by each con-
cept (Table 2) contributed to individual experimental practices. In one ex-
periment, an unexpected finding implicated a language brain region with ex-
periences of mental imagery. This finding was taken to suggest that verbal
memory is required during the effortful process of generating mental im-
agery from language cues. In another experiment, there was an unexpected
mismatch between the self-reported timing of hallucinations and the timing
of localized changes in activity expected in subjects who hallucinate. The un-
expectedness of this finding was resolved by dismissing the subject’s self-
reports; a subject cannot be relied upon to accurately report their experiences
anyway. In each case, the disciplined performances of using a given concept
(in ways structured by routine associations) provided a pathway for research-
ers to passively follow (to borrow Pickering’s language).
This path of least resistance reduced the need to publicly consider the
possibility that an unexpected result might indicate something of interest
about either the phenomena under investigation or the tools used to indi-
viduate instances of that phenomena. However, to return to an earlier point,
these unacknowledged constraints not only shaped the interpretation of such
findings but they were also evident in earlier reactive and unjustified meth-
odological choices. In each case, disciplined associations aligned the experi-
mental aims, methods, and results with the specific goal embodied by each
concept. During this alignment, investigating SLMP as either mental imagery
or hallucinations provided a limited yet flexible array of possible conceptual
sequences that could be reached from the emergent interactions within a
given experiment.
CONCLUSION
Drawing on the converging accounts of scientific practice mentioned earlier,
I have sought to harness the tension between the current independent uses of
two specific concepts (mental imagery and hallucinations) and the unre-
solved interdependence evident in their intersecting histories. In doing so,
I have focused on highlighting the structured associations within which these
concepts were each used as tools in individual experiments (where diverging
knowledge-claims were generated from equivalent neuroimaging findings).
This point builds on several others that I have touched on in passing: that
interdependent concepts can be used as tools for investigating discrete goals,
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that the goal-directed uses of concepts as tools can contribute to experimen-
tal practices in analogous ways to material instruments, that the remnants of
historical assumptions are carried along by disciplined systems of conceptual
associations in ways that remain relevant to the current uses of concepts in
generating experimental knowledge, and that these entrenched associations
can come to structure the uses of a concept even after the justifications for
such associations have been nominally discarded.
While supporting all these claims is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope
to have demonstrated the value of examining each of these points in relation
to the others. So, to conclude, I have offered a series of examples where the
concepts of mental imagery and hallucination were used in ways that relied
upon implicit associations — associations grounded by historically contingent
structures for how these concepts can be used (in concert with human and
material participants) within the temporally dynamic processes of scientific
practice. Examining the historical contexts for the disciplined practices that
structure the current uses of concepts in this way provides an avenue for un-
derstanding the diverging first-order knowledge claims generated from the
equivalent findings reported in individual experiments.
With this example, I have sought to highlight how examining the histori-
cal development of scientific concepts contributes to our understanding of
the structured routines within which these concepts are used as goal-directed
tools in experiments. As this example illustrates, there is value in drawing on
the converging insights of multiple accounts of scientific practice.
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